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Technologically advanced aircraft rely on robust and responsive logistics systems to
ensure a high state of operational readiness. This paper fills a critical gap in the lit-
erature for combat models by closely relating effectiveness of the logistics system
to determinants of success in combat. We present a stochastic diffusion model of
an aerial battle between Blue and Red forces. The number of aircraft of Blue forces
aloft and ready to be aloft on combat missions is limited by the maximum number of
assigned aircraft, the reliability of aircraft subsystems, and the logistic system’s abil-
ity to repair and replenish those subsystems. Our parsimonious model can illustrate
important trade-offs between logistics decision variables and operational success.
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1 MODELS OF LOGISTICS AND COMBAT
Technologically advanced and specialized aircraft must rely
on robust and responsive logistics systems to ensure that the
aircraft are maintained in a high state of readiness. An aircraft
maintained to a sufficient level so as to be ready to employ
on a combat mission is a necessary component of operational
success. Yet, despite the clear importance of logistics effec-
tiveness to operational success, few combat models include
relevant aspects of these systems. This paper helps to fill a
critical gap in the literature for combat models by closely
relating logistics systems’ performances to determinants of
success in combat.
In this paper, we present a model of aerial combat. We take
the classical model of Lanchesterian air combat that consists
of a system of ordinary differential equations as a point of
departure (Lanchester, 1916). Our model can accommodate a
wide variety of operational considerations, such as air-to-air
engagements and a variety of different operational parameters
like lethality and endurance. In addition, it can accommodate
the mechanical reliability of multiple subsystems and the cor-
responding performance of the logistics system with respect
to resupply and repair of those subsystems. The model can
relate a variety of operational and support parameters to the
probability of operational success.
While we focus on unmanned aircraft in this paper, our
model easily accommodates manned aircraft as well. Despite,
or perhaps because of, the technological advancement of
unmanned aircraft, they still require a high level of main-
tenance and logistical attention. Our model is intended for
a variety of uses. Our model can be employed to study the
effects of a new platform design or existing platform modifi-
cation and the resulting logistic requirements on the probabil-
ity of mission success; and to explore trade-offs between oper-
ational design characteristics and logistics characteristics, as
they relate to probability of mission success. In addition, our
model can be used at an operational level to examine the oper-
ational effects of various decisions such as where to employ
aircraft and how to arrange logistics support.
Finally, an important innovation of our model is the inclu-
sion of a stochastic diffusion process that enables the model
to provide a distribution of outcomes; cf. Arnold (1974) and
Øksendal (2013). The diffusion model represents interrelated
dynamics; see Perlas and Lehoczky (1977) for related work.
Other related works appear in Bracken, Kress, and Rosenthal
(1995), and more recently in Washburn and Kress (2009). The
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diffusion model allows assessment of the nonlinear effect of
Red and Blue logistics on the outcomes of air combat and
the effect of uncertainty on measures of performance. Quan-
tifying this uncertainty enables the model to provide valu-
able insight into the risk associated with various courses of
action.
The approach we employ in this paper holds several advan-
tages over alternative methods, such as simulation model-
ing. The diffusion model is parsimonious with transparent
assumptions. The equations can be modified to represent
other assumptions to examine their effects. In addition, the
study and display of the time evolution of measures of perfor-
mance are arguably easier with the diffusion model.
Our paper contributes to three streams of literature. First, it
includes a deterministic model of air combat and thus extends
that long literature. Second and most important, it helps to
fill a critical gap by emphasizing logistics considerations and
can relate such considerations to probability of operational
success. Finally, it contributes to the stream of literature on
applications of stochastic diffusion models. Such an applica-
tion provides invaluable information regarding the dynamic
relationship between the parameters and the measures of
performance.
Section 2 of the paper describes the diffusion model in
terms of a system of stochastic differential equations. The dif-
fusion model is a Markov process. Section 2 also discusses
a limiting model for many aircraft on both sides. Section 3
presents results comparing limiting model means and stan-
dard deviations with those from a simulation of a related
continuous-time Markov chain with 30 aircraft on each side.
The example in Section 4 uses the limiting model to illustrate
the importance of the logistics system to operational success
in a given scenario.
1.1 A review of the literature
Aerial warfare was one of the first areas to draw the atten-
tion of analysts seeking to improve a military force’s chances
of success. Lanchester’s (1916) seminal work continues to
inspire a rich and varied literature that includes analyses of
combat on the ground (Bonder, 1967; Taylor, 1983), at sea
(Hughes, 1995), in the air (Gilbert, 2011; McLemore, Gaver,
& Jacobs, 2016), and in more general terms (Brackney, 1959).
Researchers have extended the original deterministic model to
include stochastic varieties (Ancker, 1967; Karr, 1974; Kress
& Talmor, 1999) and have developed simulation models with
Lanchestarian qualities (eg, Artelli and Deckro (2008) as
well the US Army and Marine Corps’ Combat XXI lever-
age Lanchester [Balogh & Harless, 2003]). Still others have
extended such models to consider counterinsurgency (Saie &
Ahner, 2018), guerilla warfare (Deitchman, 1962; Schaffer,
1968), and cyberwarfare (Schramm & Gaver, 2013). In addi-
tion, researchers have applied Lanchester models to empirical
data from actual battles involving humans (Bracken, 1995;
Lucas & Turkes, 2004; Weiss, 1966), as well as chimpanzees
(Wilson, Britton, & Franks, 2002), and ants (McGlynn, 2000),
among others.
A common theme among these combat models is to neglect,
or at least minimize, the importance of logistics concerns.
Similarly, models of combat logistics systems often omit or
have limited views of operational aspects of the combat units
that such systems support. One technique is to relate logis-
tics effectiveness to operational “readiness”. Kang, Doerr,
and Sanchez (2006) develop a model that relates logistical
effectiveness to the availability of materiel required by a
unit of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Likewise, Hoover,
Jondrow, Trost, and Ye (2002) develop a theoretical model
that primarily examines questions at the small unit level
relating to performance metrics like aircraft readiness lev-
els resulting from removing working parts from one aircraft
to put into another whose parts have failed; see also Gaver,
Isaacson, and Abell (1993). Bazin de Jessey and Debache
(2002), Kang, Gue, and Eaton (1998), and Kang and McDon-
ald (2010) develop simulation models that relate logistics
performance to readiness of deployed aircraft. Similarly, Gue
(2003) presents a model to support dispersed operational
units supported from the sea, while Huffaker (1996) devel-
ops a theater-level model that relates supply throughput to
success in combat. In all cases, logistics performance is
related to materiel readiness, as opposed to probability of
mission success. See Beamon (1998) and Yavuz and Satir
(1995) for surveys of the literature on models of supply chain
management.
Moglewer and Payne (1970) are an exception to this phe-
nomenon. They model the distribution of supplies throughout
the battle-space from a game-theoretic perspective and ulti-
mately relate logistic effectiveness to the probability that the
operation is successful. This two-step theater-level game of
ground combat is of limited applicability to the case we
examine in this paper. Likewise, Chase (1973) is another
exception. He employs a Lanchester model of ground combat
and includes consideration of logistical capability. Ultimately,
he analyzes the choice of how much combat power to devote
to protecting supply chains required to sustain the main bodies
of the opposing forces.
The literature is sparse for combat models of
operational-level air warfare that incorporate the effective-
ness of the logistics system as a determinant for success
in combat. In this paper, we present a model that fills this
critical gap. We model an aerial battle between Blue and
Red forces. The number of aircraft that Blue forces can fly
on combat missions is limited by the reliability of aircraft
subsystems and the logistic system’s ability to repair and
replenish those subsystems. Our model illustrates several
important trade-offs between the number of Blue aircraft, the
reliability and maintainability of Red and Blue aircraft, and
Blue’s ability to successfully complete its mission. This ini-
tial study is intended to identify broad effects, and deserves
alternative formulations that can be Monte Carlo simulated,
and interpreted by expert opinion.
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2 THE MODEL
We envision a situation in which an aircraft unit, Blue (B),
engages nearby Red (R) threats in aerial combat. Blue air-
craft are supported by facilities and spares in the vicinity,
which might include sea-based platforms, amphibious war-
fare ships, littoral combat ships, or a ground-based system of
support. This framework is sufficiently flexible to consider
any scale of operation and a wide range of combat intensity.
For example, combat intensity could range from a limited
strike or show-of-force to sustained and deliberate com-
bat with a near-peer competitor. High-level low-resolution
attention is paid to mission readiness degraders, that is,
repairable/replaceable subsystems of Blue aircraft.
The model accounts for aircraft in various states of opera-
tional readiness. An aircraft can either be aloft (denoted with
subscript A), on the ground/tarmac but available (denoted
with subscript G), or down due to failure (denoted with sub-
script C). Both sides’ aircraft are launched from available
(ready) aircraft on the ground. Each side’s launch rate from
the ground is proportional to the difference between a user
defined maximum desired number of aircraft airborne and
the current number airborne. Forces in the air engage each
other with aimed fire. Analysis of data suggests that histor-
ical air combat may not be well modeled by aimed fire; cf.
Johnson and MacKay (2011). However, we assume that future
beyond visual range missile combat will increasingly have the
characteristics of aimed fire. Under conditions of aimed fire,
the number of the opposition aircraft killed increases with
the square of the number of aircraft; whereas for un-aimed
fire, the relationship between aircraft and number of oppo-
sition aircraft killed is linear. This extra weight to numbers
of aircraft relative to lethality is at least broadly consistent
with certain visions of the importance of numbers of air-
craft in the future of air warfare (Clough, 2002). If aimed fire
is unsatisfactory, the equations can be modified to include
another model. Investigating the effect of differences in these
assumptions is the topic of future research.
Aircraft remain airborne until they complete their mission;
they are lost to enemy fire; or they experience an operational
failure. An operational failure could be a spontaneous loss
of operations due to mechanical or electrical failure of some
essential subsystem. Aircraft lost to enemy fire cannot be
repaired. We defer the study of equations modified to include
aircraft damaged by enemy fire and their subsequent repair.
Upon returning to base, aircraft with failures must await main-
tenance action before returning to available status. Returning
operational aircraft without failures is available to return to
the air after a user-defined turn-around-time. There is a spec-
ified maximum total number of aircraft for each side. Both
sides’ aircraft can be reinforced from outside. Each side’s
reinforcement rate is proportional to the difference between
its user specified maximum total number and current total
number.
The time to repair or maintain aircraft is affected by the
space available to repair or maintain the aircraft; the number
and expertise of personnel; job priorities; the availability of
spare parts, and so forth. The time spent waiting for parts often
dominates the other factors. The availability of spare parts is
affected by the reordering policy, the time to deliver the spare
parts, and so forth. For transparency, our model optimistically
represents the repair facility as an infinite server queue; that
is, all aircraft needing maintenance receive service simultane-
ously and so will tend to return to ready status sooner than if
there is finite repair capability whose model has more parame-
ters. The mean time for delivery of spare parts is incorporated
in the mean time to repair. The study of a model represent-
ing finite repair capacity and the supply system for delivering
spare parts is a subject for future work.
2.1 Parameters and states
The following parameters are essential for the model and
system state variables.
2.1.1 Planning parameters
RA = maximum Red aircraft aloft;
R = maximum total number of Red aircraft; RA ≤ R;
BA = maximum Blue aircraft aloft;
B = maximum total number of Blue aircraft; BA ≤ B.
The quantities R, RA, (respectively B,BA) are Red
(respectively Blue) planning parameters.
2.1.2 State variables
The following are the state variables described in the differ-
ential equations.
• RA(t), (respectively, BA(t)) = number of Red, (respectively
Blue), aircraft aloft at time t.
• RG(t), (respectively, BG(t))= number of Red, (respectively
Blue), aircraft on the tarmac (ground) ready for operations
at time t.
• Rc(t), (respectively, Bc(t)) = number of Red, (respectively
Blue), aircraft unavailable for operations at time t due to a
type c failure, c = 1, 2, … , C.
• RC(t) =
∑
cRc(t), (respectively, BC(t)) = total number of
Red, (respectively, Blue), aircraft unavailable at time t due
to failure.
{W•(t); t≥ 0} are independent Gaussian/Wiener processes;
dW•(t) is a Weiner process increment in the interval (t, t+ dt];
it has a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance dt. In
particular, {WRAK(t); t≥ 0} is the Weiner process associated
with the change in the number of aloft Red aircraft due to attri-
tion; {WRAR(t); t≥ 0} is the Weiner process associated with
the change in the number of ready Red aircraft on the tarmac
due to aloft Red reinforcement; {WRFc(t); t≥ 0} is the Weiner
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process associated with the change in the number of unavail-
able Red aircraft due to type c failure; {WRE(t); t≥ 0} is the
Weiner process associated with the change in the number of
aloft Red aircraft due to mission end; {WRGR(t); t≥ 0} is the
Weiner process associated with the change in the number of
Red aircraft due to outside reinforcement; {WRRc(t); t≥ 0} is
the Weiner process associated with the change in the number
of unavailable Red aircraft due to repair completion of a type
c failure.
2.1.3 Rate parameters
The following are the rate parameters that describe behavior
of Red and Blue.
• 𝛽R is Red defender aimed fire attrition rate against Blue
aloft attackers; an estimate for the parameter is the initial
number of Red weapons on an aircraft multiplied by the
probability of kill per weapon, the fraction of Red aircraft’s
mission time Red is in the area of operations (AO), the frac-
tion of Blue aircraft’s mission time Blue is in the AO, and
divided by the Red aircraft’s mission time; 𝛽B is the Blue
attacker aimed fire attrition rate against Red.
• 𝛼R is Red (active) aircraft aloft reinforcement rate per frac-






, where RA is the Red aloft quota and
[RA − RA(t)]+ is Red aloft deficiency, filled from RG(t).
Conventionally, [x]+ = max(x, 0). The total reinforcement





RG(t); 1/𝛼R is the mean time
to prepare a ready aircraft on the tarmac for flight. This
functional form allows the number of Red aircraft aloft to
remain less than or equal to the maximum allowed airborne
and is proportional to the number of Red aircraft on the tar-
mac available to fly. Other functional forms are possible;
𝛼B is the Blue (active) aircraft aloft reinforcement rate per
fraction of aloft mission capable Blue aircraft needed.
• 𝛿R is the rate of Red mission termination; while 1/𝛿R is
the mean mission duration of Red aircraft; 𝛿B is the rate of
Blue mission termination.
• 𝜑Rc is the type c failure rate for an aloft Red aircraft; while
1/𝜑Rc is the Red aircraft mean time until type c failure; 𝜑Bc
is the type c failure rate for an aloft Blue aircraft.
• 𝜇Rc is the rate at which a failed Red aircraft in need of
repair for a type c failure is returned to ready on-tarmac
status. Returning an aircraft to a ready status requires main-
tenance action and may include a wait time for repair parts
or replacement subsystem; 1/𝜇Rc is the mean time to repair
a type c failure for a Red aircraft; 𝜇Bc is the rate at which a
failed Blue aircraft in need of repair for a type c failure is
returned to ready on-tarmac status.








, with R being Red’s
total defensive quota. Other functional forms are possible;
𝛾B is the Blue ground reinforcement rate per fraction of
aircraft needed.
2.1.4 State equations
Mutual attrition and support interactions: Let I(x> 0) = 1
if x> 0 and 0 otherwise. The following are primitive ordi-
nary stochastic differential equations; see Arnold (1974). For
brevity, we only display the state equations for Red variables.
The state equations for Blue have the same structure. The
change in the number of platforms in each state in a small-time
interval dt is the result of independent Poisson random vari-
ables which are represented in the model as independent




RA(t) = − 𝛽BBA(t)I(RA(t) > 0)
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c = 1, 2, … , C; these are discrete failure mode types.
In all cases, R•(t) = [R•(t)]+ and B•(t) = [B•(t)]+.
2.2 A limiting stochastic model for many Blue
and Red aircraft
Let n be the sum of the total force size in the theater of Blue
and Red, R+B, at time 0. For large n, we consider the state of
the system as a deterministic (mean) process plus a diffusion























rA(t), (respectively bA(t)), is the normalized mean number
of Red, (respectively Blue), aircraft aloft at time t; rG(t),
(respectively bG(t)) is the normalized mean number of Red
(respectively Blue) ready aircraft on the tarmac at time t; rc(t),
(respectively bc(t)), is the normalized mean number of Red
(respectively Blue) aircraft being repaired at time t for type c
failure.
Equations (2.2a) results in expressions for the state vari-
ables:
RA(t) = 𝑛𝑟A(t) +
√
nX𝑅𝐴(t);RG(t) = 𝑛𝑟G(t) +
√
nX𝑅𝐺(t);
Rc(t) = 𝑛𝑟c(t) +
√
nX𝑅𝑐(t);BA(t) = 𝑛𝑏A(t) +
√
nX𝐵𝐴(t);
BG(t) = 𝑛𝑏G(t) +
√




Put RA = nR
′
A, B = nB
′
, BA = nB
′
A, R = nR
′
, 𝛾B = n𝛾B′,
𝛾R = n𝛾R′.
Substitute expressions (2.2b) into Equations (2.1a)-(2.1c).
For there to be a limiting process as n becomes large, the
terms of order n and terms of order
√
n in the resulting
equations must be equal to 0; cf. Gaver and Lehoczky (1976)
and McNeil and Schach (1973). The terms of order n result
in equations specifying the mean of the limiting process and
the terms of order
√
n result in linear stochastic differential
equations for the random terms X•(t). Details of the result-
ing stochastic differential equations for Red appear in
Appendix A. The equations for Blue have the same structure.
2.3 Differential equations for the means
and covariances of the limiting process
The expected values of the resulting limiting multidimen-
sional process satisfy the system of Equations (A.5a)–(A.7a).
For simplicity, assume there is one type
of Blue-failure (respectively Red-failure) and
put XBc(t) = XBC(t) and XRc(t) = XRC(t). Let
X(t)=(X𝑅𝐴(t),X𝑅𝐺(t),X𝑅𝐶 (t),X𝐵𝐴(t),X𝐵𝐺(t),X𝐵𝐶 (t))T
and W(t) = (WR(t),WB(t))
T where WR(t) =
(W𝑅𝐴𝐾 (t),W𝑅𝐴𝑅(t),W𝑅𝐸(t),W𝑅𝐹 (t),W𝑅𝑅𝑐(t)W𝑅𝐺𝑅(t)) and
WB(t) = (W𝐵𝐴𝐾 (t),W𝐵𝐴𝑅(t),W𝐵𝐸(t),W𝐵𝐹 (t),W𝐵𝑅𝑐(t),
W𝐵𝐺𝑅(t)).
{W•(t); t≥ 0} are independent Weiner processes and vT
denotes the transpose of the row vector v.




X(t) = A X(t) + DdW(t). (2.3)
Let C(t) be a matrix whose (i, j)th element is Cov(Xi(t), Xj(t)).
The variance-covariance matrix of the stochastic process




C(t) = A(t)C(t) + C(t)A(t)T + D(t)D(t)T . (2.4)
2.4 The force ratio and loss exchange ratio
The force ratio for aloft aircraft (FOR) at time t is BA(t)
RA(t)
.
The loss exchange ratio (LER) at time t is RK (t)
BK (t)
where BK(t),
(respectively RK(t)), is the number of Blue (respectively Red)
aircraft killed during (0, t]. Blue has more aloft aircraft
(respectively fewer aircraft killed) than Red when the FOR
(respectively LER) is greater than 1. A FOR (respectively
LER) less than 1 reflects a disadvantage to Blue.







= P{BK(t) − RK(t) < 0}. (2.5)
The limiting process, (2.2b), results in BK(t)−RK(t) having
a normal distribution with mean E[BK]−E[RK] and variance
Var[BK]− 2Cov(BK , RK)+Var[RK]. If there are no outside
reinforcements, 𝛾R = 𝛾B = 0, then
E[RK(t)] = R − [E[RA(t)] + E[RG(t)] + E[RC(t)]], (2.6a)
𝑉 𝑎𝑟[RK(t)] =𝑉 𝑎𝑟[RA(t)] + 𝑉 𝑎𝑟[RG(t)] + 𝑉 𝑎𝑟[RC(t)]
+ 2[𝐶𝑜𝑣(RA(t),RG(t)) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(RA(t),RC(t))
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(RG(t),RC(t))], (2.6b)
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TABLE 1 Diffusion model and simulation comparison
Blue failure rate 0.5 0.25 0.025 0.5 0.25 0.025
Blue repair rate 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2
Number Blue aloft Mean (Std. dev.) Simulation 5.25 (2.32) 8.01 (2.80) 15.03 (3.25) 3.45 (1.94) 5.84 (2.53) 14.24 (3.33)
Mean (Std. dev.) Diffusion 5.34 (2.31) 8.20 (2.78) 15.13 (3.14) 3.61 (1.91) 6.02 (2.52) 14.43 (3.19)
Number Blue ready Mean (Std. dev.) Simulation 3.98 (2.07) 4.01 (2.06) 3.92 (2.06) 2.54 (1.63) 2.75 (1.69) 3.54 (1.97)
Mean (Std. dev.) Diffusion 4.05 (2.09) 4.06 (2.10) 3.86 (2.08) 2.63 (1.64) 2.78 (1.72) 3.52 (1.99)
Number Blue in repair Mean (Std. dev.) Simulation 6.68 (2.66) 5.18 (2.30) 0.96 (0.96) 9.19 (3.15) 7.73 (2.82) 1.82 (1.33)
Mean (Std. dev.) Diffusion 6.86 (2.64) 5.22 (2.26) 0.95 (0.97) 9.59 (3.05) 7.91 (2.81) 1.83 (1.33)
Number Red aloft Mean (Std. dev.) Simulation 6.15 (2.51) 4.59 (2.52) 1.87 (1.94) 7.18 (2.48) 5.67 (2.54) 2.08 (2.04)
Mean (Std. dev.) Diffusion 6.25 (2.51) 4.70 (2.53) 2.04 (1.69) 7.23 (2.48) 5.75 (2.54) 2.20 (1.81)
Number Red ready Mean (Std. dev.) Simulation 1.61 (1.29) 1.24 (1.15) 0.62 (0.83) 1.90 (1.35) 1.49 (1.24) 0.66 (0.86)
Mean (Std. dev.) Diffusion 1.62 (1.28) 1.23 (1.14) 0.64 (0.82) 1.89 (1.36) 1.49 (1.24) 0.67 (0.84)
Number Red in repair Mean (Std. dev.) Simulation 12.79 (2.86) 10.84 (2.97) 7.09 (2.82) 14.04 (2.85) 12.15 (2.89) 7.30 (2.83)
Mean (Std. dev.) Diffusion 12.91 (2.87) 11.00 (2.95) 7.40 (2.76) 14.09 (2.83) 12.24 (2.92) 7.64 (2.82)
𝐶𝑜𝑣(BK(t),RK(t)) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(BA(t),RA(t))
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(BA(t),RG(t)) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(BA(t),RC(t))
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(BG(t),RA(t)) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(BG(t),RG(t))
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(BG(t),RC(t)) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(BC(t),RA(t))
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(BC(t),RG(t)) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(BC(t),RC(t)). (2.6c)
The variance of BK(t) has a similar expression.
3 COMPARISON OF A CONTINUOUS TIME
MARKOV CHAIN MODEL AND THE
LIMITING PROCESS
In this section we compare sample means and sample
standard deviations of a simulation of a related contin-
uous time Markov chain model with 30 aircraft on each
side to the expected values and standard deviations of
the limiting process, (2.2b), for the stochastic differential
equations (2.1a)–(2.1c). The transition rates of the continu-
ous time Markov chain appear in Appendix B. For all cases in
this section B = BA = 30 and R = RA = 30; there is one type
of failure. The limiting process, (2.2b), uses n = R + B = 60.
Further, BG(0) = RG(0) = 30. The Red attrition parame-
ter against Blue is 𝛽R = 0.03. The attrition parameter for
Blue against Red, 𝛽B = 0.027. The mean time aloft for both
Red and Blue aircraft is 1/𝛿B = 1/𝛿R = 10 hours; the mean
time to turn around a ready aircraft for both Red and Blue,
1/𝛼B = 1/𝛼R = 1 hour; there are no outside reinforcements
on either side: 𝛾B = 𝛾R = 0; the mean time until failure of
Red aircraft, 1/𝜑R = 100/9 hours; the mean time for Red air-
craft maintenance/repair, 1/𝜇R = 20 hours. Table 1 displays
the expected values and standard deviations of the limiting
process compared to the sample means and sample standard
deviations of the simulation of the continuous time Markov
chain, at t = 2 days, (48 hours), for various values of the
parameters Blue failure rate, 𝜑B, and Blue repair rate, 𝜇B.
The simulation has 10,000 independent replications.
FIGURE 1 Normalized difference between limiting process and
simulation results
Figure 1 displays the differences between the limiting
process expected value and the simulation sample mean
(respectively the limiting process standard deviation minus
the simulation sample standard deviation) divided by the
simulation sample mean (respectively the simulation sample
standard deviation) as a function of the simulation sample
mean. The simulation results and the limiting process results
for expected value and standard deviation agree reasonably
well. Most of the limiting process expected number of aircraft
in each state are greater than their corresponding simulation
sample mean plus 2 standard errors. However, Figure 1 indi-
cates that the normalized differences between the simulation
sample mean and limiting process expected value are less
than 10%. The limiting process (2.2b) and the continuous
time Markov chain are different. Since the simulation of the
continuous time Markov chain has 10,000 replications, it is
not surprising that most of limiting process’ expected values
differ from their corresponding simulation sample means by
more than 2 standard errors. A 10% normalized difference
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between the two is unlikely to be of operational or managerial
significance.
The largest absolute values of the normalized differences
for the mean and standard deviation occur when the Blue fail-
ure rate is 0.025. In these cases, the mean number of ready
Red aircraft on the tarmac is less than 0.7. In all the other
cases, the mean number of Red and Blue aircraft in each state
is greater than 0.7. The distribution of the limiting process
(2.2b) is multivariate normal; if the mean number of aircraft
in a state is close to 0, then there can be a substantial positive
probability that the number of aircraft in the state is negative.
A subject of future study are boundary conditions to ensure
that the limiting process values are not negative.
Not surprisingly, the size of the increase in the mean num-
ber of Blues aloft when the failure rate𝜑B is halved from 0.5 to
0.25 depends on the repair rate 𝜇B; when the repair rate is 0.4,
(respectively 0.2), the mean number of Blues aloft increases
by 54% (respectively 74%) when the failure rate decreases
from 0.5 to 0.25.
4 EXAMPLE
A medium to large UAV with air-to-air combat capability is
expected in approximately 15 years (US Air Force, 2009).
We consider a scenario set in the next 15-20 years in which
the operational objective is to mass airpower in the form of
a swarm of recoverable UAVs with air-to-air combat capa-
bility in an objective area to achieve air superiority over Red
forces. At this point we assume only unmanned weapon sys-
tems on either side, though future work could include a mix
of manned and unmanned platforms. A burgeoning litera-
ture has emerged that imagines the future of air warfare. For
example, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2000) and Clough (2002)
examine UAVs and swarm tactic; while Munoz (2011),
Neuenswander (2013), and Sirak (2007) analyze air-to-air
warfare specifically.
We consider a simple scenario, displayed in Figure 2,
to demonstrate the use of the model. In our scenario, the
Blue commander must choose between two forward operat-
ing bases (FOBs): LC and LF. The Blue UAVs are repaired
and maintained at the FOBs; they fly from the FOB to the
objective area to engage aloft Red UAVs. The most obvious
difference between the FOBs is their proximity to the objec-
tive area. Location LC is closer to the objective area. Location
LC allows UAVs more time flying in the objective area.
FIGURE 2 Scenario description [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 3 Number of Blue forces
However, it also increases the mean time to repair failures due
to increased time to obtain spare parts and subsystems. The
characteristics of the scenario primarily impact two parame-
ters in the model. They are 𝛽B, the rate at which a Blue UAV
kills Red UAVs and 𝜇B, the rate at which Blue can respond to
maintenance/repair problems.
Both Blue and Red forces have a total of 500 UAVs and
observe the battle over the course of 5 days. All aircraft begin
in ready status on the tarmac and there is no limit to the
proportion of aircraft that either side allows airborne. There
is one type of failure. The parameters for Blue aircraft oper-
ating from the FOB that is closer to the objective area (LC)
and those of Red are: B = BA = 500 and R = RA = 500;
BG(0) = RG(0) = 500; 𝛿B = 𝛿R = 0.1; 𝜑B = 𝜑R = 0.091;
𝛼B = 𝛼R = 1; 𝛾B = 𝛾R = 0; 𝜇R = 0.091; 𝛽R = 0.032; 𝜇B = 0.1;
𝛽B = 0.030. The set of Blue parameters for the FOB that is
further away from the objective area (LF) are equal to those
of closer location except 𝜇B = 0.25; 𝛽B = 0.028.
The limiting process, (2.2b), uses n = R + B = 1000.
Figures 3–6 display results for the two possible locations
of the FOB. Figure 3, (respectively Figure 4), displays the
expected number of Blue, (respectively Red), UAVs in each
state plus and minus one standard deviation as a function of
time over the course of the 120 hours under consideration.
First, we see that when Blue deploys from the closer FOB,
the mean number of Blue UAVs aloft (solid blue line) is
less than that for the farther location for times greater than
20 hours. The primary difference is that the mean number of
Blue UAVs down for maintenance/repair (solid red line) is
smaller for the further location due to the higher performance
of the logistics system. Comparing the Blue means to the cor-
responding Red means in Figure 4, we see that the Red and
Blue performance is comparable when Blue deploys from the
closer location. When Blue deploys from the further location,
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FIGURE 4 Number of Red forces
FIGURE 5 Probability ratio is less than 1.0
the mean number of Blue UAVs aloft exceeds that of Red. In
this case, the improved logistics system for the more distant
Blue location enables Blue to overcome the increased transit
time to the objective area, thus offsetting the decrease in the
Blue kill rate against Red.
Figure 5 displays the limiting process probability that each
of FOR and LER is less than 1 for the two locations. A ratio
less than 1 suggests that Blue is at a disadvantage. We define
mission success at time 120 hours as having fewer than 10
Red UAVs aloft; having more than 100 Blue UAVs aloft; and
having a LER greater than 1. Figure 6 displays the probability
that the number of Red UAVs aloft is less than or equal to 10
FIGURE 6 Probability for number of UAVs aloft
and the probability the number of Blue UAVs aloft is greater
than 100 over the course of 120 hours.
The more distant FOB results in a greater number of Blue
UAVs aloft which causes more Red UAVs to be killed com-
pared to that of the FOB closer to the objective area. The
FOB further away from the objective area has a smaller prob-
ability the LER (respectively FOR) is less than 1 for times
greater than 25 hours. The probability that there are more than
100 Blue UAVs aloft for the more distant FOB decreases to
less than 0.3 at time 120 hours suggesting risk to mission
success.
Next, we vary the Blue failure rate and the number of Blue
UAVs to study their impact on operational success. From
a programming and budgeting standpoint, decision-makers
often must consider where to devote resources to make the
most positive impact towards operational success. Our model
allows us to quantify the trade-off between improving a design
parameter such as the reliability of a system versus simply
buying and employing more aircraft. Table 2 displays the
mean and standard deviation of the number of Red (respec-
tively Blue) UAVs aloft at time 120 hours; the probability the
LER (respectively FOR) is less than 1; and the probability
Red (respectively Blue) has fewer than 10 UAVs (respectively
more than 100 UAVs) aloft at time 120 hours for the mean
Blue repair time, 1/𝜇B = 4, and various values of the number
of Blue UAVs and the Blue failure rate. The other parameters
are those of the more distant FOB location.
The first row displays the results from the baseline more
distant Blue location, while the next row displays the outcome
for Blue UAVs with improved reliability. The third and fourth
rows display the results for additional Blue UAVs and the
previous failure rates. Decreasing the Blue failure rate from
0.091 to 0.05 has about the same effect as increasing the ini-
tial number of Blue UAVs by 50 with the larger Blue failure
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TABLE 2 Design parameter trade-offs
Number of Red
UAVs aloft at
t = 120 h
Number of Blue
UAVs aloft at
t = 120 h
Number of Blue









less than 1 at
t = 120 h
Probability
LER is
less than 1 at
t = 120 h
Probability number of
Red UAVs aloft is
less than or equal
to 10 at t = 120 h
Probability number
of Blue UAVs aloft is
greater than 100 at
t = 120 h
500 0.091 24.6 (12.4) 82.9 (29.5) 0.03 0.16 0.13 0.03
500 0.05 11.2 (4.5) 138.5(26.0) 0.00 0.00 0.44 1.00
550 0.091 10.6 (3.8) 150.3 (21.3) 0.00 0.00 0.49 1.00
550 0.05 6.6 (2.4) 199.3 (19.5) 0.00 0.00 0.94 1.00
FIGURE 7 Unfavorable LER as a function of number of Blue UAVs and
availability
rate 0.091. Not surprisingly, decreasing the Blue failure rate
to 0.05 and increasing the number of Blue UAVs to 550 yields
the best results.
Finally, we examine the effect of the availability of the air-
craft. The long run average proportion of time a Blue UAV is
up, ignoring turnaround time, is
1∕𝜑B
(1∕𝜑B)+(1∕𝜇B)
, which we call
the availability of the Blue UAV; the availability of the Red
UAV is defined similarly. Figure 7 displays the probability the
LER is less than 1 (Blue is at a disadvantage) at time 120 hours
for Red UAV availability equal to 0.5 and 0.6 for various val-
ues of Blue UAV availability and various values of the number
of Blue UAVs at time 0; all Red and Blue UAVs are ready
on the tarmac at time 0; the Red and Blue UAV failure rates
are equal. The parameters for Figure 7 are those of the closer
FOB except for the Blue aimed fire attrition rate against Red
whose value is that of the more distant FOB giving each Blue
UAV a disadvantage:
R(0) = R = RA = 500; 𝛿R = 𝛿B = 0.1; 𝛼R = 𝛼B = 1;
𝛽R = 0.032; 𝛽B = 0.025.
The solid (respectively dashed) line in Figure 7 corre-
sponds to the common Red and Blue failure rate equal to 0.05
(respectively 0.091).
Figure 7 suggests that the probability is a nonlinear function
of the Red and Blue failure rates and availabilities. When Red
availability is 0.6 and Blue availability is 0.5, the probability
associated with the common failure rate of 0.091 is greater
than that associated with the common failure rate of 0.5. In
the other cases Blue availability is greater than or equal to Red
availability and the probability associated with the common
failure rate of 0.091 is about equal to or less than the probabil-
ity associated with the common failure rate of 0.05. In these
cases, a common failure rate equal to 0.05 results in more Blue
UAVs being airborne causing a greater Blue exposure to Red
attrition than the common failure rate 0.091. Not surprisingly,
the probability decreases as the Blue availability increases
and as the number of Blue UAVs increases. The probabil-
ity values associated with Red availability equal to 0.6 are
greater than or equal to those associated with Red availability
equal to 0.5.
5 DISCUSSION
Deploying manned and unmanned aircraft that succeed in
combat in the future will require a robust and responsive logis-
tics system to ensure a high state of operational readiness. A
parsimonious diffusion model of the effect of logistics on an
aerial battle between Red and Blue forces has been presented.
A limiting process for many aircraft on both sides is obtained.
Results from the limiting process compare favorably to those
from a simulation of a related continuous time Markov
chain. The limiting process allows assessment of uncer-
tainty in measures of performance such as force ratio and
loss exchange ratio giving more information to the decision
maker concerning mission risk. Numerical examples illus-
trate the model’s use in making operational decisions regard-
ing dispositions of forces, as well as exploration of design
trade-offs.
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APPENDIX A: THE LIMITING STOCHASTIC MODEL
We approximate the nonlinear function [x]+ appearing in
Equations (2.1a)-(2.1c) with a linear function by invoking the































The gamma cumulative distribution function is a common
smooth approximation for the indicator function I(x> 0); in
particular we use the gamma cumulative distribution func-
tion with shape parameter = 2 and mean = 0.03 as a smooth
approximation to I(x> 0); other approximations are possible,
cf. Sullivan, Crone, and Jalickee (1980). Specifically, for x> 0









































Inserting (2.2b) into (2.1a) and using approximations similar

















































































































Identify terms of order n:
d
𝑑𝑡









× rG(t) − 𝛿RrA(t) − 𝜑RrA(t). (A.5a)





X𝑅𝐴(t) = − 𝛽BI(bA(t) > 0)fI(rA(t))I(rA(t) > 0)X𝐵𝐴(t)



















− [𝛿R + 𝜑R]I(rA(t) > 0)X𝑅𝐴(t)
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Insert (2.2b) into (2.1b) and using approximations similar to
(A.1) and (A.4).
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Insert (2.2b) into (2.1c) and using approximations similar to
(A.1) and (A.4).
Identify terms of order n:
d
𝑑𝑡
rc(t) = −𝜇𝑅𝑐rc(t) + 𝜑𝑅𝑐rA(t) (A.7a)











APPENDIX B: THE TRANSITION RATES OF THE
CONTINUOUS TIME MARKOV CHAIN MODEL
Let
Y(t) = (R(t),B(t)) = (RA(t),RG(t),
RC(t),BA(t),BG(t),BC(t)). (B.1)
The means and variances of the limiting process (2.2b) are
compared to that of a simulation of a continuous time Markov
chain model with transition rates
P{Y(t + h) = (rA − 1, rG, rC, bA, bG, bC)|Y(t)
= (rA, rG, rC, bA, bG, bC)}
= 𝛽BbAI(rA > 0)h + o(h), (B.2a)
P{Y(t + h) = (rA + 1, rG − 1, rC, bA, bG, bC)|Y(t)






rGh + o(h), (B.2b)
P{Y(t + h) = (rA − 1, rG + 1, rC, bA, bG, bC)|Y(t)
= (rA, rG, rC, bA, bG, bC)} = 𝛿RrAh + o(h), (B.2c)
P{Y(t + h) = (rA − 1, rG, rC + 1, bA, bG, bC)|Y(t)
= (rA, rG, rC, bA, bG, bC)}
= 𝜑RrAh + o(h), (B.2d)
P{Y(t + h) = (rA, rG + 1, rC − 1, bA, bG, bC)|Y(t)
= (rA, rG, rC, bA, bG, bC)}
= 𝜇RrCh + o(h), (B.2e)
P{Y(t + h) = (rA, rG + 1, rC, bA, bG, bC)|Y(t)
= (rA, rG, rC, bA, bG, bC)}
= 𝛾R
[





P{Y(t + h) = (rA, rG, rC, bA − 1, bG, bC)|Y(t)
= (rA, rG, rC, bA, bG, bC)}
= 𝛽RrAI(bA > 0)h + o(h), (B.3a)
P{Y(t + h) = (rA, rG, rC, bA + 1, bG − 1, bC)|Y(t)






bGh + o(h), (B.3b)
P{Y(t + h) = (rA, rG, rC, bA − 1, bG + 1, bC)|Y(t)
= (rA, rG, rC, bA, bG, bC)}
= 𝛿BbAh + o(h), (B.3c)
P{Y(t + h) = (rA, rG, rC, bA − 1, bG, bC + 1)|Y(t)
= (rA, rG, rC, bA, bG, bC)}
= 𝜑BbAh + o(h), (B.3d)
P{Y(t + h) = (rA, rG, rC, bA, bG + 1, bC − 1)|Y(t)
= (rA, rG, rC, bA, bG, bC)}
= 𝜇BbCh + o(h), (B.3e)
P{Y(t + h) = (rA, rG, rC, bA, bG + 1, bC)|Y(t)
= (rA, rG, rC, bA, bG, bC)}
= 𝛾B
[
B − bA − bG − bC
B
]+
h + o(h). (B.3f)
